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Watkins: Community Entitled to Reimbursement for Enchanced Value of Separa

MARITAL PROPERTY-Division of Property Upon DivorceCommunity Entitled to Reimbursement for Enhanced Value
of Separately Owned Corporate Stock
Jensen v. Jensen,
665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
On March 20, 1975, Robert Lee Jensen purchased stock in RLJ Printing
Company, Inc. (RLJ).' Four months after this acquisition he married
Burlene Parks Jensen.2 During their marriage, Mr. Jensen devoted ninety
percent of his time to the company; his managerial skills caused the value
of the company's stock to increase substantially.3 After five years of marriage, the Jensens were granted a divorce. 4 The trial court found the stock
and its enhanced value to be Mr. Jensen's separate property and denied
Mrs. Jensen any interest in its appreciated value.' The Tyler court of appeals reversed, holding that the community estate was entitled to compensation for the enhanced value of the stock.' The Texas Supreme Court
granted Mr. Jensen's application for writ of error.7 Held-Affirmed 8 The
1. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. 1984). Mr. Jensen formed RLJ in
order to purchase Newspaper Enterprises. See id. at 257. After acquiring Newspaper Enterprises, Mr. Jensen purchased 48,455 of RLJ's 100,000 shares for $1.56 a share. See id at 257.
He was also trustee of an additional 2000 shares, giving him control over a majority of the
company's stock. See Jensen v. Jensen, 629 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982), aff'd,
665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
2. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. 1984).
3. See Jensen v. Jensen, 629 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982), a#'d, 665
S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. 1984).
4. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. 1984).
5. See id at 108.
6. See Jensen v. Jensen, 629 S.W.2d 222, 224-27 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982), af'd, 665
S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
7. See Jensen v. Jensen, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 247, 248 (Mar. 2, 1983) (opinion of supreme
court granting writ of error).
8. SeeJensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. 1984). On July 6, 1983, the Supreme
Court of Texas handed down its opinion on Jensen v. Jensen, affirming the decision of the
court of appeals. See Jensen v. Jensen, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 480, 481 (July 6, 1983), withdrawn,
27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 68 (Nov. 9, 1983), withdrawn, 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984). Justice Kilgarlin, writing for the majority, upheld the court of appeals decision characterizing the enhanced value of Mr. Jensen's separately owned corporate stock as community property. See
id at 482. A strong dissent espoused a reimbursement theory as more equitable and more
consistent with the Texas Constitution, case law, and statutes. See id at 483. No entitlement
to the enhanced value was found, however, because the salary received by Mr. Jensen during the marriage was reasonable. See id at 484. On a motion for rehearing, the opinion of
July 6, 1983, was withdrawn. See Jensen v. Jensen, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 68 (Nov. 9, 1983),
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community is entitled to reimbursement for the enhanced value of separately owned corporate stock less compensation received by the community for its expenditure of time and labor in achieving that enhancement. 9
With the community property system there are three distinct property
estates: (1) the husband's separate estate, (2) the wife's separate estate, and
(3) the community estate.' 0 Separate property is that which is possessed
before marriage, property acquired by gift, devise, or descent during the
marriage, and sums recovered as damages for personal injuries which occur during the marriage." Community property is all property acquired
during the marriage which is not separate property. 12 There are eight3
states which follow the community property system of marital property.'
withdrawn, 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984). The opinion substituted reversed the court of appeals decision rendering judgment for Mr. Jensen. See id at 70-7 1. Justice Wallace, writing
for the majority, declared that the reimbursement theory should be applied. See id at 69.
Thus, the enhanced value of Mr. Jensen's separately owned stock would remain his separate
property subject only to a right of reimbursement for his time, talent, and labor. See id at
70. As Mrs. Jensen had failed to show the salaries paid to Mr. Jensen were unreasonable,
she had not proven a right to reimbursement, and, therefore, she had no interest in the
enhanced value of the stock. See id at 70. Again, on motion for rehearing, the opinion of
the court was withdrawn and a new opinion substituted in which the court altered its second
opinion only by its decision to remand on the issue of the reasonableness of Mr. Jensen's
salary. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1984). The evidence presented at
trial was found inadequate to determine whether the salary was reasonable. See id at 110.
9. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984).
10. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (defining separate and community property); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1975) (delineates marital property as separate or community). See generally McKnight, Husband & Wfe, Property Rights and Liabilities, 13 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 735, 736-46 (1982) (commentary on development of marital property as defined in Family Code).
11. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a) (Vernon 1975); see also Perez v. Perez, 587
S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1979) (applying statutory definition of marital property). Definitions
of separate property in other jurisdictions are in accord. See, e.g., In re Torrey's Estate, 95
P.2d 990, 992 (Ariz. 1939) (property owned before marriage and acquired afterward by "gift,
devise, or descent" is separate property); McDonald v. Lambert, 85 P.2d 78, 82 (N.M. 1938)
(property owned by husband or wife before marriage separate property); Conley v. Moe, 110
P.2d 172, 175 (Wash. 1941) (property acquired before marriage is separate property).
12. See, e.g., Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 501, 260 S.W.2d 676, 680 (1953) (community labor, talent, and funds expended on production and sale of gas renders gas community property); Smith v. Buss, 135 Tex. 566, 571, 144 S.W.2d 529, 531 (1940) (property
acquired by either spouse during marriage is community property); Oppenheimer v. Robinson, 87 Tex. 174, 177, 28 S.W. 95, 96 (1894) (property deeded wife during marriage presumed community property); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(b) (Vernon 1975). See
generally Smith, Characterization of Property, I TEX. BAR ASS'N ADVANCED FAM. L.
COURSE B-1, B-8-20 (1982) (discussion on application of statutory definition to characterize
marital property as separate or community).
13. See Hammonds v. Commissioner, 106 F.2d 420, 423 (10th Cir. 1939) (community
property law of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, and
Washington drawn from Spanish and French law).
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Contrary to the common law property system, 14 community property law
allows either spouse to own property which is separate and apart from the
marital estate.' 5 The Spanish civil law concept of community property has
been firmly embedded in Texas constitutional and statutory provisions
since Texas was a republic.'
Consequently, whatever interest either
spouse may possess in the community or separate estate
is defined by the
8
Texas Constitution 7 and by legislative enactment.'
Division of the community estate upon divorce is governed by section
3.63 of the Texas Family Code, which gives the trial court broad discretionary power to divide the community in a fair and equitable manner.' 9
Upon divorce, the property of both spouses must be characterized as part
14. See Leake v. Saunders, 126 Tex. 69, 69, 84 S.W.2d 993, 993 (1935) (under common
law, identity of wife merged with husband's).
15. See, e.g., Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 573, 342 S.W.2d 565, 567 (1961) (marital
property "either separate or community"); Franklin v. Woods, 598 S.W.2d 946, 948-49 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (property purchased while unmarried is separate
property of owner spouse after marriage); Taylor v. Hollingsworth, 169 S.W.2d 519, 522
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1943) (property acquired by gift, devise, or descent during marriage is separate property), aft'd, 142 Tex. 158, 176 S.W.2d 733 (1944).
16. See Law of Jan. 20, 1840, 1840 Tex. Gen. Laws 3, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS
177 (1838-46) ("An Act to adopt the Common Law of England,--to repeal certain Mexican
Laws, and to regulate the Marital Rights of parties"); see also Huie, Commentary on the
Community Property Laws of Texas, 13 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 2, 2-3 (Vernon 1960)
(discussion of Spanish origin of Texas law).
17. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15. The constitution states in pertinent part: "All
property, both real and personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before marriage, and that
acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent, shall be the separate property of that spouse."
Id
18. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1975). The statute provides as follows:

(a) A spouse's separate property consists of:
(1) the property owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage;
(2) the property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or descent; and
(3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage,
except any recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage.
(b) Community property consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage.
Id
19. See, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974) (division of community property need not be equal but lies within discretion of court); In re Marriage of York, 613
S.W.2d 764, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) (section 3.63 of Texas Family
Code gives court broad discretion in dividing community estate); Daniel v. Daniel, 30
S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1930, no writ) (within discretion of court to
make partition of personal property which seems just and right); see also TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984); McKnight, Family Law.- Husband and Wfe, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 97, 139-43 (1982) (discussion of discretion exercised in division of property in divorce). Although broad discretion is given the court, such discretion is
subject to abuse. See In re Marriage of York, 613 S.W.2d 764, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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of either the separate or community estate before a division of the community can be effectuated. 2' Although a spouse cannot be divested of his or
her separate property, all property possessed by either spouse upon dissolution of the marriage is statutorily presumed to be community property. 2
This presumption may be rebutted, however, by satisfactory evidence
proving that the contested property is in fact a part of a spouse's separate
estate.22 Once property has been characterized as either community or
separate, the trial court then divides the community estate in a manner it
deems equitable, taking into consideration the circumstances of the divorce, the financial condition of both parties, and the rights and needs of
any children.23
An additional consideration in the characterization of property arises
whenever community assets have been utilized for the improvement, benefit, or enhancement of separate property.2 4 It is clear that in Texas, absent

Amarillo 1981, no writ) (failure to characterize certain property as part of community resulted in abuse of discretion).
20. See Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]
1974, no writ) (initial step in division of property is to establish it as community or separate);
see also Nichols, Division of Property on Divorce, 1 TEX. BAR. ASS'N ADVANCED FAM. L.
COURSE E, E-3 (1982) (outline of court's duty in regard to division of property on divorce).
21. See Purser v. Purser, 604 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no
writ) (failure of husband to produce evidence that funds used to purchase property were
separate resulted in presumption of community); see also TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02
(Vernon 1975). The statute reads in pertinent part: "Property possessed by either spouse
during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property." Id
22. See, e.g., Tarver v. Tarver, 394 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tex. 1965) (statute forms rebuttable presumption in favor of community property; contrary must be satisfactorily proved);
Wilson v. Wilson, 145 Tex. 607, 610, 201 S.W.2d 226, 227 (1947) (law imposes rebuttable
presumption; must prove otherwise by clear evidence); Schreiner v. Schreiner, 502 S.W.2d
840, 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ dism'd) (statute creates rebuttable presumption which places burden of proving contrary on one claiming property to be separate).
For examples of what constitutes separate property, see, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 473 S.W.2d
299, 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971), writ refdn.r.e per curiam, 478 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.
1972) (recovery for personal injuries of husband and wife is separate property); Hays v.
Marble, 213 S.W.2d 329, 333-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1948, writ dism'd) (land inherited from father and mother separate property); Steele v. Caldwell, 158 S.W.2d 867, 869
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1942, no writ) (land acquired before marriage is separate
property).
23. See Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 233-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [list Dist.]
1974, no writ) (factors considered in division of property: spouse's earning capacity, business opportunity, educational background, physical condition, possible need for future support); see also TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
24. See, e.g., Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 320, 83 S.W.2d 620, 627 (1935) (court
characterizes improvements made to separate property by community estate); Stringfellow v.
Sorrells, 82 Tex. 277, 278, 18 S.W. 689, 689 (1891) (court considers increased value of separately owned mules fed and cared for by community estate); Schmidt v. Huppman, 3 Tex.
112, 116, 11 S.W. 175, 176 (1889) (court characterizes profits from separate property used to
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a valid agreement to the contrary, profits or income derived from separate
property will be characterized as community property." This is based on
the rationale that, although the profits are derived from the separate estate,
the income or profits would not have been forthcoming without the aid of
one or both spouses.26 Profits derived from separate property which are
due to the industry and skill of either spouse are, therefore, to be treated as
community property.27 Reimbursement is applied, however, where community funds have created merely a growth in the corpus of the separate
estate.28 The community is denied any property interest in the increase
because separation of the increase from the corpus itself would destroy the
integrity of the spouse's separate estate. 29 The community is instead entitled to the equitable remedy of reimbursement so that it may recover the
expenses it has incurred from the separate estate. 30 The same is also true
when community funds are utilized by the separate estate to make improvements; 31 the separate estate is allowed to keep the improvements sub-

improve community estate); see also White v. Hugh Lynch & Co., 26 Tex. 195, 195-96 (1862)
(lumber from wife's mill cut by wife's slaves is community property).
25. See, e.g., White v. Hugh Lynch & Co., 26 Tex. 195, 196 (1862) (lumber cut from
wife's mill is community property); Mortenson v. Trammell, 604 S.W.2d 269, 274-75 (Tex.
Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.) (income from savings account and certificates of deposit acquired by gift is community property); Craxton v. Ryan, 3 Willson 439,
439 (Tex. Ct. App. 1888) (bricks from soil of wife's separate estate community property).
26. See De Blane v. Hugh Lynch & Co., 23 Tex. 25, 29 (1859). In De Blane, the court
relied on the fact that the husband acted as trustee for the wife's separate estate, giving rise
to the presumption that the husband's industry and skill must have been employed in the
management and production of the cotton in question. See id at 29.
27. See, e.g., Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 320, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935) (community entitled to be reimbursed for community funds expended on behalf of separate estate of
husband); Furrh v. Winston, 66 Tex. 521, 524, 1 S.W. 527, 529 (1886) (community entitled to
reimbursement for costs made on behalf of separate estate); Bond v. Hill, 37 Tex. 626, 62728 (1873) (husband entitled to reimbursement for funds expended on wife's separate
property).
28. See Stringfellow v. Sorrells, 82 Tex. 277, 278-79, 18 S.W. 689, 689 (1891) (court
denied creditor's claim that increased value of separately owned mules was community
property).
29. See id at 278-79, 18 S.W. at 689.
30. See Furrh v. Winston, 66 Tex. 521, 524, 1 S.W. 527, 529 (1886) (buildings erected
on separate property by community estate entitle community to equitable right of
reimbursement).
31. See id at 524, 1 S.W. at 529. Since the community has no interest in separately
owned realty, the buildings will vest in the separate estate; the separate estate, however, will
be required to pay the community estate for the cost of the buildings. See id at 524, 1 S.W.
at 529. The right to reimbursement is an equitable remedy; therefore, application of the rule
"lies within the discretion of the trial court." See Vailone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459
(Tex. 1982).
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ject only to a right to reimbursement.32
A distinct issue arises when the time, talent, and labor of one or both
spouses have been expended on separate property and result in both profits
and the appreciation of the separate estate.33 Unlike community funds,
the time, talent, and labor of the community prior to Vallone have not
been considered community expenses. 34 Historically, it has been unclear
whether the community should be compensated by applying the right of
reimbursement or by characterizing the enhanced value of the separate
estate as community property.3" In an early line of Texas cases, the courts
characterized everything acquired by community efforts as community
property.36 In this respect, Texas law parallels the Spanish civil law,37
which provides that the time, talent, and labor of either spouse are wholly
owned by the community estate.38 Using this rationale, courts had little
difficulty in determining that an increase in the separate estate which was
attributable to the industry and skill of one or both spouses was in fact
community property, therefore treating the problem as one of title charac-

32. See Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 320, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935) (separate estate
of husband must reimburse community for expense of improvements to separate property).
33. See, e.g., Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1982) (court considered
enhanced value of separately owned corporation and time of community utilized by separate estate); Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 501, 260 S.W.2d 676, 680 (1953) (court examined community time involved in acquiring gas wells purchased with separate funds of
husband); Bell v. Bell, 504 S.W.2d 610, 611-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont) (court considers
business conducted by husband through corporations and enhanced value of stock), rev'd
513 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1974).
34. See Hale v. Hale, 557 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ)
(time, talent, and labor not community expense), overruled, Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d
455 (Tex. 1982).
35. See Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 497-98, 260 S.W.2d 676, 680 (1953) (utilization of community time and effort impressed community character on separate property); In
re Marriage of York, 613 S.W.2d 764, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ) (enhanced value of separately owned tire company community property due to community
time expended).
36. See, e.g., White v. Hugh Lynch & Co., 26 Tex. 195, 196 (1862) (lumber produced
from wife's separately owned mill community property); De Blanc v. Hugh Lynch & Co., 23
Tex. 25, 29 (1859) (cotton grown and harvested from wife's separately owned land is community property); Craxton v. Ryan, 3 Willson 439, 439 (Tex. Ct. App. 1888) (bricks manufactured from soil of wife's separate property is community property).
37. See Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. 1972) (Texas courts apply test
similar to test used under Spanish civil law).
38. See, e.g., id at 392 ("property is community which is acquired by the work, efforts
or labor of the spouses"); Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 498, 260 S.W.2d 676, 680 (1953)
(community time, talent, and labor expended on separate estate may impress community
character upon it); In re Marriage of York, 613 S.W.2d 764, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1981, no writ) ("if the separate property of one spouse is increased due to time, talent and
industry of either spouse . . . then the entire increase acquires a community character").
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terization rather than reimbursement.3 9 Each spouse is granted a reasonable amount of time to maintain and preserve his or her separate estate,4 °
but any time expended beyond this is considered community time.4
In Hale v. Hale,4 2 the Texarkana court of civil appeals expressly rejected
the view that the industry and skill of either spouse devoted to his or her
separate estate was a cost to the community. 43 The Texas Supreme Court,
in Vailone v. Vallone,44 however, recently disapproved of the Hale decision
and declared that the right to reimbursement also arises whenever community time, talent, and labor have been used to improve or enhance separate
property.4 5 After Vallone, it would seem that the time, talent, and labor of
either spouse would be considered expenses to the community if they were
utilized to improve the separate estate, therefore changing the focus from
that of title characterization to reimbursement. 6

39. See Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 498, 260 S.W.2d 676, 680 (1953). In Norris,
the Texas Supreme Court found that the industry and skill of either spouse may impress a
community character upon separate property; this suggests that Texas courts were then concerned with the character of the enhanced value of separate property produced by community time. See id at 497-98, 260 S.W.2d at 680.
40. See Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. 1982) (spouse may devote reasonable amount of time to preservation of separate estate); Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491,
499, 260 S.W.2d 676, 681 (1953) (time of husband devoted to separate property found necessary for preservation of separate estate).
41. See Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 500, 260 S.W.2d 676, 681 (1953) (community
time expended on gas wells purchased with separate funds beyond what was necessary for
preservation renders gas produced community property).
42. 557 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ), overruled, Vallone v.
Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982).
43. See id at 615. The husband in Hale claimed a right to reimbursement for the industry and skill he contributed to improving his wife's separately owned house. See id at
615. The wife had spent her own separate funds on the materials needed to make the additions and improvements to her house, but the husband, a construction laborer, alleged that
his time and talents in construction were utilized by the separate estate. See id. at 615. The
Hale court held that only when community funds were expended for improvements to the
separate estate could the community assert a right to reimbursement. See id at 615.
44. 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982).
45. See id. at 459. "To the extent that Hale v. Hale. . . held that community time,
talent and labor may under no circumstances give rise to an equitable right of reimbursement in the community's favor, it is hereby disapproved." See id at 459. The court noted
that several other jurisdictions employ some form of reimbursement. See id. at 459 n. 1.
46. See id at 459. The Vallone court stated that the right to reimbursement arises when
separate property benefits from community labor; it is not an interest equitable or otherwise
in the property itself, nor a debt which may be enforced, but is instead an equitable right
which may be asserted upon divorce, annulment, or death of the community partner. See id
at 458-59. The court then turned away from a previous line of cases, which characterized
the enhanced value of separate property as community property, and instead viewed the
time, talent, and labor of the community as a cost to the community estate for which it must
be reimbursed. See id at 459. See generally Comment, Closely Held Corporation in the

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 1, Art. 8

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:277

In Jensen v. Jensen,47 the Texas Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether the community estate was entitled to compensation for the enhanced value of separately owned corporate stock. 48 Justice Wallace, writing for the court, noted that there are two approaches to compensating the
community estate: (1) the "reimbursement" theory, and (2) the "community ownership" theory. 49 The court concluded that the "reimbursement"
theory is the more equitable of the two because it allows the community
estate to be reimbursed for its time while preserving the separate estate of
the owner spouse."0 The Jensen court also observed that this theory is consistent with the Texas Constitution, statutes, and case law."' Finding there
was insufficient evidence to sustain the trial court's determination that the
salaries and dividends received by Mr. Jensen were reasonable, the court
remanded the case to the trial court to make a proper decision based on
adequate evidence.5 2 The Jensen court declared that, should a right to reimbursement be shown to exist, the salaries received should be subtracted
from the value of time, talent, and labor expended by the owner spouse. 3
It was further determined that no lien should attach to Mr. Jensen's separately owned
stock, but that a money judgment should be awarded
54
instead.

Community property law favors a right to reimbursement over the characterization of the enhanced value of a separately owned business as community property because the enhancement is in the nature of an
improvement to the separate estate. 5 The enhancement can be viewed

Wake of Vallone: Enhancement of Stock Value by Community Time, Talent and Labor, 35
L. REV. 47 (1983) (general discussion of Vallone).
47. 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
48. See id at 109.
49. See id at 109.
50. See id at 109.
51. See id. at 109.
52. See id at 110.
53. Seeid at 110.
54. See id at 110-11. The concurring opinion of Justice Robertson clarifies a procedural point. See id. at 110 (Robertson, J., concurring). He states simply that Jensen represents a return to the liberal construction of pleadings in divorce suits. See id at 110-11
(Robertson, J., concurring). Although Mrs. Jensen did not specifically plead reimbursement,
the cause was remanded to find if, based on the reimbursement theory, compensation was
owed to the community. See id. at 110-11 (Robertson, J., concurring). Thus, the departure
in Vallone from the broad construction of pleadings in family law cases was ended with the
court's decision in Jensen. See id at 110-11 (Robertson, J., concurring).
55. See Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1982). The Vallone court held
that a right to be reimbursed accrues to the community estate whenever the industry and
skill of a community partner are used for the improvement or benefit of the separate estate.
See id at 459.
BAYLOR
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simply as an increase in the corpus of the estate itself.56 The time and
effort contributed by Mr. Jensen to his separate property is not unlike the
instance in which community funds are used to make improvements to
separately owned realty." Rather than spending community funds to benefit separate realty, however, the community, through Mr. Jensen, has contributed its time, talent, and labor to the husband's separate estate,
resulting in a substantial increase in the value of his property. 58 As in
cases where community funds are spent to benefit a separate estate, 59 the
holding in Jensen requires Mr. Jensen's separate estate to reimburse the
community for its contribution.' Therefore, the time, talent, and labor of
either spouse can be considered an expenditure of the community made on
behalf of the separate estate. 6 '
56. SeeStringfellow v. Sorrells, 82 Tex. 277, 278, 18 S.W. 689, 689 (1891). In Stringfellow, a judgment creditor of the husband levied on two mules which were the separate property of the wife. See id at 277, 18 S.W. at 689. The creditor claimed that the mules were
community property because the community had fed them and the husband had cared for
them during the marriage. See id at 278, 18 S.W. at 689. The court held they were not
community property although they had grown and increased in value due to the community's feed and care. See id at 278-79, 18 S.W. at 689. The court stated that to hold otherwise would destroy the "corpus of the wife's estate." See id at 278, 18 S.W. at 689.
57. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984); see also Burton v. Bell, 380
S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1964) (children of deceased husband claim right to reimbursement for
community funds expended on improvements to widow's separate estate); Lindsay v.
Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 600, 254 S.W.2d 777, 781 (1952) (husband claims right to reimbursement for community funds spent in order to make installment payments on wife's separate
property); Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 308-10, 83 S.W.2d 620, 622-23 (1935) (wife claims
right to reimbursement for improvements made on deceased husband's land).
58. See Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1982). In Vallone, the Texas
Supreme Court for the first time held that the time, talent, and labor of the community gives
rise to a right of reimbursement. See id at 459. Previously, such a claim had been rejected
by the Texarkana court of civil appeals. See Hale v. Hale, 557 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ), overruled,Vallone v. Vallone 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982).
The Valione court stated that "[a] right of reimbursement arises when the funds or assets of
one estate are used to benefit and enhance another estate without itself receiving some benefit." See Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1982) (emphasis added).
59. See Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 320, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935) (separate estate
of owner spouse must pay when community funds are spent to improve separately owned
land).
60. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1984); Furrh v. Winston, 66 Tex.
521, 524, 1 S.W. 527, 529 (1886). In Furrh, it was alleged that buildings erected by the
community on the separate estate of one spouse constituted community property. See id at
524, 1 S.W. at 529. The court held that the improvements could not be divided from the
separate estate. See id at 524, 1 S.W. at 529. Because the buildings and land were not
divisible interests, the improvements would vest in the separate estate and the community
would be entitled to reimbursement for the costs it had incurred. See id at 224, 1 S.W. at
229.
61. See Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1982) (right to reimbursement
arises when community assets are used to benefit separate estate).
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Additionally, because the enhancement of separately owned corporate
stock can be viewed simply as an increase in the corpus of the separate
estate, the result in Jensen is consistent with cases which hold that profits
or rents from separate property are community property. 62 Since the enhancement is merely a change in, and not a product of, the separate estate,
it would be difficult to sever the increase which has occurred during the
marriage from Mr. Jensen's initial purchase of RLJ stock.63 To characterize the enhancement as community property would tend to impair the
corpus of the stock.' By employing the "reimbursement" theory, however, the Jensen court manages to preserve the integrity of the separate
estate while allowing the community to recover the benefits it has contributed to the increase.6 5
When applying the right of reimbursement to a time, talent, and labor
demand, the basis for recovery is the value of the community partner's
services.16 Logically, in determining whether the community has been adequately compensated, a court will consider the salaries, bonuses, dividends, and other fringe benefits which the owner spouse has received from
the separately owned business. 67 The right to reimbursement is particularly applicable to the situation in Jensen, in light of Mrs. Jensen's argu62. See Stringfellow v. Sorrells, 82 Tex. 277, 278, 18 S.W. 689, 689 (1891) (mules remained separate property of wife although increase in their value was due to community
feed and care; increase was merely growth of mules themselves). For cases dealing with
profits and rents, see Gifford v. Gabbard, 305 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1957, no writ) (profits from separately owned business held to be community property);
Simmons v. Clampitt Paper Co. 223 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1949, writ
refd n.r.e.) (rents from lease of separately owned property held to be community property).
63. See Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58, 66 (1858). In a case involving improvements made to
separately owned land, the court stated: "They are fixtures, attached to the soil, and cannot
in the nature of things be divisible in specie, where one of the joint owners has no interest in
the land upon which they have been erected." See id at 66.
64. See Stringfellow v. Sorrells, 82 Tex. 277, 278, 18 S.W. 689, 689 (1891). In Stringellow, the court stated that the offspring of separately owned livestock had been recognized as
community property, but a mere increase in the size or value of livestock was not community property. See id at 278, 18 S.W. at 689. "It would tend to entirely destroy the corpus of
the wife's estate, consisting of live personal property, to declare that an augmentation in
weight or value should be deemed an 'increase' of the property itself so as to constitute a
part of the community to that extent." Id at 278-79, 18 S.W. at 689.
65. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984). Writing for the majority,
Justice Wallace states that the right to reimbursement "more nearly affords justice to both
the community and separate estates." See id at 109.
66. See id at 109 (right to reimbursement requires that community estate be compensated for value of either spouse's industry and skill); see also Trawick v. Trawick, 671
S.W.2d 105, 108-09 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ) (applying reimbursement theory
from Jensen), Katson v. Katson, 89 P.2d 524, 525 (N.M. 1939) (right to reimbursement allocated from reasonable value of spouse's services to community).
67. See Speer v. Quinlan, 525 P.2d 314, 322-23 (Idaho 1974) (community entitled to
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ment that the salaries and other benefits received by the community were
unreasonable and inadequate when compared to the amount of time her
husband devoted to his separately owned business.6 8 Mrs. Jensen's claim
to the enhanced value of the stock revolved around the community time
spent in developing the separately owned corporation.69 The most logical
method of compensating a person for his or her time is by paying a salary
and providing other benefits which his or her time, talent, and labor deserve.7" Thus, courts have been inclined to look at the salary and other
benefits which a non-owner employee would have been paid to fill the
position which the owner spouse occupied.7 1 Where the actual salaries
and benefits received are less than what a non-owner employee would
have received, the spouse's separate estate should be required to pay the
difference to reimburse the community estate.72
As salaries received by either spouse during the marriage are community property, 73 the salaries and benefits which RLJ had paid to Mr. Jen-

difference between salaries and other benefits received from separately owned business and
what court determines is reasonable recompense for husband's efforts).
68. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 108-09 (Tex. 1984). On appeal, Mrs. Jensen
contested the finding of the trial court that the salaries and other benefits received by the
community were adequate and reasonable. See id at 108-09.
69. See id at 108-09; see also Katson v. Katson, 89 P.2d 524, 526 (N.M. 1939). In
Katson, the court declared that if a third party had been employed by the husband to run his
separately owned corporation, the entire proceeds of the business could have been retained
by the separate estate. See id at 526. Therefore, unless the community estate has contributed to the separately owned business, it has no interest at all in any increase in its value.
See id at 526.
70. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984); see also Speer v. Quinlan,
525 P.2d 314, 323 (Idaho 1974) (evidence of salaries and benefits which non-owner employee
would receive in a position comparable to that of owner spouse); Katson v. Katson, 89 P.2d
524, 526 (N.M. 1939) (wages paid for services similar to those rendered by owner spouse
may be considered as evidence).
71. See, e.g., Tassi v. Tassi, 325 P.2d 872, 878 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (value of
spouse's services is community's interest in separately owned business); Speer v. Quinlan,
525 P.2d 314, 323 (Idaho 1974) (value of services performed by spouse is measure of community compensation); Katson v. Katson, 89 P.2d 524, 526 (N.M. 1939) (court held value of
spouse's services is measure of compensation to community estate).
72. See Speer v. Quinlan, 525 P.2d 314, 323 (Idaho 1974). In Speer,the Idaho Supreme
Court stated:
[if] the community has been deprived of adequate compensation for its services, the
community would be entitled to a judgment against the owner spouse equivalent to the
difference between the income actually received by the community in the form of compensation from the business, and the income which the community would have received
had the owner spouse been justly compensated.
Id. at 323.
73. See Bantuelle v. Bantuelle, 195 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1946,
no writ) (rents, profits, earnings, and other income derived from separately owned business
are community property); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(b) (Vernon 1975) (defining commu-
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sen during the marriage would appear to have at least partially
compensated the community for its time. 4 Under the "reimbursement"
theory, the salaries, dividends, and bonuses paid by a separately owned
business are in fact taken into consideration by a court when determining
what compensation is owed to the community estate. 75 In essence, the salaries and other benefits received by the community are deemed to be at
least partial payment for the time, talent, and labor of the owner spouse.7 6
In contrast, courts which employ a title characterization theory would
characterize the enhanced value of the separately owned stock as community property.7 7 Under the facts of Jensen, not only would the separate
estate have compensated the community for Mr. Jensen's time through the
salaries, dividends, and bonuses it had paid, but it would also have been
required to surrender the enhanced value of the separate stock. 78 Thus,
under title characterization, in paying out salaries, dividends, bonuses, and
79
other fringe benefits which the community receives during the marriage,
and in relinquishing to the community the enhancement which has accrued during that period, the separate estate is required to pay the community twice for the benefit of the owner spouse's time.80 The right to

nity property); see also Katson v. Katson, 89 P.2d 524, 526 (N.M. 1939) (spouses' salaries are
owned by community).
74. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984); see also Speer v. Quinlan,
525 P.2d 314, 323 (Idaho 1974) (reasonable compensation for husband's services offset by
salary and other benefits received).
75. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984). "The right to reimbursement is only for the value of the time, toil and effort expended to enhance the separate estate
for which the community did not receive adequate compensation." Id at 109.
76. See In re Herbert's Estate, 14 P.2d 6, 8 (Wash. 1932) (salary paid owner spouse,
which under circumstances was adequate compensation, is measure of community interest
in spouse's time and effort); see also Trawick v. Trawick, 671 S.W.2d 105, 108-09 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1984, no writ) (application of "reimbursement" theory in Texas; salary, life
insurance premiums, death benefits, and use of company car considered as partial compensation of community).
77. See In re Marriage of York, 613 S.W.2d 764, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981,
no writ) (community entitled to that part of enhanced value of company attributable to
owner spouse's industry and skill).
78. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. 1984) (separate property remains
separate subject only to right of reimbursement). CompareBell v. Bell, 504 S.W.2d 610, 612
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont) (wife entitled to appreciated value of corporate assets even
though already compensated by salaries of husband), rey'd, 513 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1974) with
Katson v. Katson 89 P.2d 524, 526 (N.M. 1939) (community entitled only to reasonable
value of spouse's services).
79. See Katson v. Katson, 89 P.2d 524, 526 (N.M. 1939). The New Mexico Supreme
Court stated "that the community owns the earning power of the husband, and that when it
is used in the conduct of his separate business, the portion of the earnings attributable to his
personal activities and talent is community property." Id at 526.
80. See In re Marriage of York, 613 S.W.2d 764, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981,
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reimbursement avoids this problem of double compensation by allowing
the separate estate to keep the enhanced value of the stock, subject only to
the community's right to be reimbursed for the time, talent, and labor not
compensated by the salaries and other benefits it has already received."'
Prior to Jensen, six of the community property states applied variations
of the "reimbursement" theory when dealing with time, talent, and labor
claims made by the community.8 2 Thus, there is considerable persuasive
authority for the majority's application of the right to reimbursement in
Jensen.8 3 It was not intended that the owner of separate property should
engage a manager to direct his separately owned business in order to preserve its separate character; "separate property should have the direction
of the owner."84 As in other states adopting the "reimbursement" theory,
Texas preserves the valuable right of personal management of one's separate estate while adequately compensating the community for its
contribution.8 5
The increased value of Mr. Jensen's stock which has occurred during the
no writ). The court stated that "if the separate property of one spouse is increaseddue to the
time, talent and industry of either spouse, beyond that required to preserve such property,
then the entire increase acquires a community character." Id at 770.
81. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984) (community's interest in
enhanced value of separate stock is right of reimbursement).
82. See Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 n.1 (Tex. 1982). Footnote one of the
Vallone opinion lists the six states which apply the right to reimbursement rule: Arizona,
California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, and Washington. See id at 459 n. 1.
83. See, e.g., Speer v. Quinlan, 525 P.2d 314, 323 (Idaho 1974) (applied right to reimbursement where trial court awarded wife interest in husband's separately owned stock);
Katson v. Katson, 89 P.2d 524, 525-28 (N.M. 1939) (applied right to reimbursement where
wife claimed interest in husband's separately owned stock); Hamlin v. Merlino, 272 P.2d
125, 126-29 (Wash. 1954) (applied right to reimbursement where deceased wife's administrator claimed community had interest in husband's separately owned corporation). But see
Mauzy v. Legislative Restricting Bd., 471 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex. 1971). "Decisions of courts
of other jurisdictions, even if based upon identical facts, are no more than persuasive, and
they are persuasive only to the extent that their reasoning is regarded as logical." Id at 573.
84. See Katson v. Katson, 89 P.2d 524, 526 (N.M. 1939). In a case similar to Jensen, the
New Mexico Supreme Court considered whether the community had an interest in the enhanced value of the owner spouse's separately owned corporation. See id at 525. The court
held that while the salaries earned by either spouse are community property, the owner
spouse need not employ a manager so that he might retain his separate property. See id at
526. Being a man of considerable experience in the printing and publishing business, Mr.
Jensen was in a better position than most to manage and supervise his separately owned
publishing business. See Jensen v. Jensen, 629 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982),
afl'd, 665 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. 1984). Mr. Jensen had been an accountant at the Times
Mirror Company and risen to the position of president. See id at 226. He also served on the
board of several corporations and banks. See id at 226.
85. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. 1984); see also Katson v. Katson 89
P.2d 524, 526 (N.J. 1939) (right of reimbursement protects separate estate and allows owner
to manage without impressing community character on separate property).
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marriage is in the nature of an improvement to the separate estate created
by community assets. It is a mere increase in the value of the corpus itself
and not something which can be severed from the separate estate. Since
the enhancement is both a community improvement and an increase in the
corpus of the separately owned stock, the right to reimbursement is the
best approach to employ when compensating the community for its time,
talent, and labor. The enhancement cannot be severed because it is part of
the stock itself, and the efforts of the community can be reimbursed much
as if community funds had been spent. It appears to be the most equitable
theory of compensation because it compensates the community for its industry and skill yet preserves the integrity of the separate estate. The right
to reimbursement correctly bases compensation on the value of a spouse's
services, thus avoiding double compensation which occurs when the increase is characterized as community property. As a result, both the separate and community estates are justly treated and the interests of both
preserved by the "reimbursement" theory.
Gregory L Watkins
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